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NOTES
IMMUNIZING THE INVESTIGATING PROSECUTOR: SHOULD THE
DISHONEST GO FREE OR THE HONEST DEFEND?
INTRODUCTION
The position of prosecutors in the judiciary and the breadth of prosecutorial
authority' simultaneously create a great potential for abuse of their tremen-
dous power. 2 Individuals who claim a deprivation of their rights by malin-
tentioned prosecutors often resort to the federal forum for redress.3 The Civil
Rights Act section 1983 creates a federal damage remedy for persons alleging
violations of their constitutional rights by those acting under color of state
law. 4 Similarly, the Supreme Court has held that the Constitution creates an
implied cause of action against federal agents who violate the Constitution
during the exercise of their duties.'
State and federal prosecutors, however, have generally been held to be
1. H. Kerper, Introduction to the Criminal Justice System 431 (2d ed. 1979); Jackson, The
Federal Prosecutor, 31 J. Grim. L. 3, 3 (1940); Reiben, Abuse of Power, II Trial Law. Q. 99, 108
(1976). See generally The Prosecutor (W. McDonald ed. 1979) (collection of essays on the variety
of prosecutorial functions).
2. Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1133, 1202-04
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Developments]; Note, Liability of Judicial Officers Under Section
1983, 79 Yale L.J. 322, 329 n.45 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Judicial Officers].
3. The jurisdictional counterparts to the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976), are 28
U.S.C. §§ 1343(3), 1343(4). Prior to 1980, plaintiffs asserting that the nationwide service of
process clause gave district courts the inherent authority to exert personal jurisdiction over
officials often attempted to use the broad venue provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) In federal
remedy actions. In Stafford v. Briggs, 100 S. Ct. 774 (1980), however, the Supreme Court ruled
that § 1391(e) is limited to mandamus actions brought against federal officials. In so doing, the
Supreme Court limited the plaintiff's choice of forum and the potential deterrence of official
abuse otherwise effected by the statute. See Note, Driver v. Helms and the Long-Arm,
Strong-Arm Effects of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e), 48 Fordharn L. Rev. 83 (1979).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) provides: "Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress."
5. In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), the Supreme Court held
that a federal official could be sued directly under the fourth amendment to the Constitution, On
remand, analogizing to common law and § 1983 cases, the Second Circuit held the government
agents to be amenable to suit, but entitled to a good faith/probable cause defense. 456 F.2d 1339,
1341 (2d Cir. 1972). For purposes of immunity, no distinction is drawn between § 1983 actions
and direct suits brought under the Constitution against federal officials. Butz v. Economou, 438
U.S. 478, 504 (1978); Brawer v. Horowitz, 535 F.2d 830, 834 (3d Cir. 1976); Apton v. Wilson,
506 F.2d 83, 90-93 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Bethea v. Reid, 445 F.2d 1163, 1166 (3d Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1061 (1972). Furthermore, the sole Supreme Court decision to apply prosecuto-
rial immunity to § 1983 actions, Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976), has been explicitly
relied on by the lower courts to determine when absolute immunity protects federal prosecutors.
See, e.g., Forsyth v. Kleindienst, 599 F.2d 1203, 1212-15 (3d Cir. 1979); Briggs v. Goodwin, 569
F.2d 10, 17-23 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 904 (1978).
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absolutely immune from such suits.6 Under the doctrine of absolute immu-
nity the suit is defeated at the outset, regardless of the alleged egregiousness of
the prosecutor's conduct.7 Recently, in Imbler v. Pachtman,8 applying com-
mon law immunity to section 1983 suits, the Supreme Court held the state
prosecutor to be absolutely immune for his decisions to initiate criminal
proceedings and his handling of cases. 9 Although the Court did not directly
address the issue, it did recognize lower federal court decisions that had
denied such immunity to prosecutors engaged in investigative or administra-
tive activities."0 When the prosecutor's alleged conduct falls into one of these
categories, it is deemed beyond the scope of his quasi-judicial authority and
he is then entitled only to the qualified immunity afforded other government
officials."1 Qualified immunity places the burden on the official to defend his
actions. To avoid liability, therefore, the prosecutor must establish his good
faith and the reasonableness of his behavior in light of the circumstances.'
2
Lower court decisions have continued to distinguish the quasi-judicial and
investigative functions of the prosecutor, but extend immunity to those
investigations he undertakes in relation to a specific prosecution. 13
This Note first examines the policy justifications underlying the grant of
absolute immunity at common law and the Supreme Court's application of
those considerations to federal suits. Second, it analyzes the various ap-
proaches used to delineate the scope of absolute prosecutorial immunity, and
argues that the current applications are impractical and fail to implement
properly the intended purposes of immunity. Finally, the Note balances the
considerations that militate against expanding the immunity beyond common
6. See, e.g., Tyler v. Witkowski, 511 F.2d 449 (7th Cir. 1975); United States ex I'. Rauch v.
Deutsch, 456 F.2d 1301 (3d Cir. 1972); Ney v. California, 439 F.2d 1285 (9th Cir. 1971);
Carmack v. Gibson, 363 F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1966); Scolnick v. Lefkowitz, 329 F.2d 716 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 825 (1964); Kostal v. Stoner, 292 F.2d 492 (10th Cir. 1961).
7. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 419 n. 13 (1976); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 895D,
at 412-14 (1979); W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts 970 (4th ed. 1971).
8. 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
9. Id. at 431. Absolute immunity does not generally bar federal injunctive relief. Mitchum v,
Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242-43 (1972); see Timmerman v. Brown, 528 F.2d 811 (4th Cir. 197S);
Boyd v. Adams, 513 F.2d 83 (7th Cir. 1975); Krahm v. Graham, 461 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1972).
When an injunction is sought against a prosecutor during the course of a state trial, however,
principles of equity and federalism will prevent it from being issued "in the absence of a showving
of irreparable injury which is 'both great and immediate.' " O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488,
499 (1974) (quoting Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 54 (197 1)); see Guerro v. Mulhearn, 498 F.2d
1249, 1253-55 (1st Cir. 1974).
10. 424 U.S. at 430-31.
11. Jacobson v. Rose, 592 F.2d 515 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 930 (1979); Walker
v. Cahalan, 542 F.2d 681 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 966 (1977); Wilhelm v. Turner,
431 F.2d 177 (8th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 947 (1971); Robichaud v. Ronan, 351 F.2d
533 (9th Cir. 1965); Peterson v. Stanczak, 48 F.R.D. 426 (N.D. I. 1969).
12. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 419 n.13 (1976); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232,
247-48 (1974).
13. See, e.g., Forsyth v. Kleindienst, 599 F.2d 1203 (3d Cir. 1979); Briggs v. Goodwin. 569
F.2d 10 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 904 (1978); Atkins v. Lanning, 556 F.2d 485
(10th Cir. 1977).
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law limitations with the potential benefits to the judicial process by expanding
its scope.
I. ABSOLUTE PROSECUTORIAL IMMUNITY
A. Common Law Origins
Judges,1 4 witnesses,'- and jurors' 6 have long been afforded absolute im-
munity for acts performed within the scope of their official capacities. 17 This
protection was originally justified by the need to protect the exercise of their
judgment free from the threat of vexatious suits by dissatisfied litigants.18
Prosecutorial immunity was created by analogizing the prosecutor's discretion-
ary authority to that of a judge and characterizing the prosecutor as a
quasi-judicial officer. 9
14. Alzua v. Johnson, 231 U.S. 106 (1913); Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871).
English law had long recognized the doctrine of judicial immunity because of the need to preserve
both judicial discretion and the King's records. See, e.g., Floyd v. Barker, 77 Eng. Rep, 1305
(K.B. 1607). See generally Note, Quasi-Judicial Immunity: Its Scope and Limitations in Section
1983 Actions, 1976 Duke L.J. 95, 112-14 [hereinafter cited as Quasi-Judicial Immunity]. United
States courts recognized this doctrine as early as 1810. See Yates v. Lansing, 5 Johns. 282, 296,
298 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1810), aff'd, 9 Johns. 395 (N.Y. 1811). See also Early v. Fitzpatrick, 161 Ala.
171, 172-73, 49 So. 686, 686 (1909); Sweeney v. Young, 82 N.H. 159, 160-61, 131 A. 155, 157-58
(1925). The rationales for affording judges absolute immunity include: (1) conservation of judicial
time spent in private litigation; (2) preservation of judicial discretion; (3) fear that qualified people
will be deterred from office; (4) insuring an independent judiciary; (5) need for finality In
litigation; (6) unfairness of vesting one with authority and then subjecting his judgment to review
by others. Jennings, Tort Liability of Administrative OfJicers, 21 Minn. L. Rev. 263, 271-72
(1937). See also Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Damage Actions, 77 Harv. L.
Rev. 209, 223-24 (1963). For a general discussion of the history of judicial immunity, see 47 Miss.
L.J. 812 (1976).
15. Sacks v. Stecker, 60 F.2d 73, 75 (2d Cir. 1932); Johnson v. Dover, 201 Ark. 175, 176,
143 S.W.2d 1112, 1113 (1940); Laing v. Mitten, 185 Mass. 233, 235, 70 N.E. 128, 129 (1904);
Johnston v. Schlarb, 7 Wash. 2d 528, 535, 110 P.2d 190, 194-95 (1941). The doctrine was applied
to witnesses to encourage full disclosure of all possibly relevant information. Sacks v. Stecker, 60
F.2d at 75; Weil v. Lynds, 105 Kan. 440, 442, 185 P. 51, 52 (1919); Hoar v. Wood, 44 Mass. 193,
194, 197 (1841).
16. Turpen v. Booth, 56 Cal. 65, 69 (1880); Sidener v. Russell, 34 Ill. App. 446, 447 (1890);
Hunter v. Mathis, 40 Ind. 356, 358 (1872).
17. The Supreme Court recognized the doctrine of judicial immunity in Bradley v. Fisher, 80
U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871). The Court held that a judge is not amenable to civil suit unless he
acts with a complete absence of jurisdiction over the subject matter. The immunity protects the
judge regardless of the extent of the alleged error or the severity of the injury inflicted on the
complainant, and even if malicious or corrupt behavior is alleged. Id. at 347, 351.
18. Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347, 351 (1871) (judges); Sacks v. Stecker, 60
F.2d 73, 75 (2d Cir. 1932) (witnesses); Sidener v. Russell, 34 Ill. App. 446, 447 (1890) (jurors);
Scott v. Stansfield, L R. 3 Ex. 220, 223 (1868). The doctrine could not be applied if the
challenged activity was merely ministerial. Turpen v. Booth, 56 Cal. 65, 69 (1880). See generally
2 F. Harper & F. James, The Law of Torts § 29.10, at 1638-39 (1956).
19. See, e.g., Pearson v. Reed, 6 Cal. App. 2d 277, 287, 44 P.2d 592, 597 (1935); Smith v.
Parman, 101 Kan. 115, 116, 165 P. 663, 663 (1917); Kittler v. Kelsch, 56 N.D. 227, 234, 216
N.W. 898, 900 (1927); Creelman v. Svenning, 67 Wash. 2d 882, 884, 410 P.2d 606, 607 (1966).
But see Orso v. City of Honolulu, 56 Hawaii 241, 248, 534 P.2d 489, 493 (1975).
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Absolute immunity from malicious prosecution suits 20 ensures that the
prosecutor is not required to defend groundless charges that could potentially
be brought by every acquitted defendant. 21 Because the threat of retaliatory
suits might influence the prosecutor's decisions, the grant of absolute immu-
nity protects his impartial judgment. 22 To safeguard judicial freedom of
expression, the prosecutor has also been protected from suits alleging defama-
tory words in the pleadings and affidavits or in open court proceedings. 23
Although the immunity is purportedly limited to communications relevant to
trial proceedings,2 4 only words totally unrelated and unnecessary2 to the
proceedings are actionable. 26 The public interest in encouraging the presenta-
tion of all relevant evidence of criminal activity to the trier of fact 27 requires
20. See, e.g., Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1926), aff'd per curiam, 275 U.S.
503 (1927); White v. Brinkman, 23 Cal. App. 2d 307, 73 P.2d 254 (1937); Pearson v. Reed, 6 Cal,
App. 2d 277, 44 P.2d 592 (1935); Kittler v. Kelsch, 56 N.D. 227, 216 N.W. 898 (1927); Watts v,
Gerking, 111 Or. 654, 228 P. 135 (1924); Creelman v. Svenning, 67 Wash. 2d 882, 410 P.2d 606
(1966). Griffith v. Slinkard, 146 Ind. 117, 44 N.E. 1001 (1896), is usually cited as the first case to
grant absolute prosecutorial immunity in a malicious prosecution suit. But see Cashen v. Spann,
66 N.J. 541, 334 A.2d 8 (1975) (court declined to immunize the prosecutor from charges of an
illegal search). Because a search can more appropriately be categorized as investigatory than
prosecutorial, Cashen neither contradicts Imbler nor the weight of federal case law. The language
in early malicious prosecution cases often indicates acceptance of a very broad immunity. See,
e.g., Pearson v. Reed, 6 Cal. App. 2d 277, 44 P.2d 592 (1935); Watts v. Gerking, 111 Or. 654,
228 P. 135 (1924). In fact, government officials were generally amenable to suits for false arrest.
See, e.g., Schneider v. Shepherd, 192 Mich. 82, 158 N.W. 182 (1916) (prosecuting attorney);
Shaw v. Moon, 117 Or. 558, 245 P. 318 (1926) (justice of the peace).
21. Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950);
Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396, 399 (2d Cir. 1926), aff'd per curiam, 275 U.S. 503 (1927).
22. See, e.g., Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949), cer. denied, 339 U.S. 949
(1950); Sacks v. Stecker, 60 F.2d 73, 75 (2d Cir. 1932); Pearson v. Reed, 6 Cal. App. 2d 277, 287,
44 P.2d 592, 597 (1935); Copeland v. Donovan, 124 Misc. 553, 554, 208 N.Y.S. 765, 767 (Erie
County Ct. 1925); cf. Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347 (1871) (judicial immunity). In
Gregoire, the Second Circuit determined that only a person with extraordinary resolve or
complete irresponsibility could withstand the inclination to consider the potential liability
resulting from every judicially related decision if he was amenable to civil suits. 177 F.2d at 581.
23. 1 F. Harper & F. James, supra note 18, at 427 (1956); see W. Prosser, supra note 7,
§ 114, at 777-78. Privately retained counsel, as well as government prosecutors, are completely
immune from defamation actions at common law. See, e.g., Latimer v. Oyler, 108 Kan. 476, 196
P. 610 (1921); Willner v. Hermelin, 73 N.Y.S.2d 412 (Sup. Ct. 1947), aff'd mer., 273 A.D. 816,
76 N.Y.S.2d 846 (2d Dep't 1948); McKinney v. Cooper, 163 Or. 512, 98 P.2d 711 (1940); Irwin v.
Ashurst, 158 Or. 61, 74 P.2d 1127 (1938).
24. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Cannon, 229 Md. 92, 98-100, 182 A.2d 54, 58-59 (1962); Ramstead
v. Morgan, 219 Or. 383, 388, 347 P.2d 594, 596 (1959); Massey v, Jones, 182 Va. 200, 204,
28 S.E.2d 623, 626-27 (1944).
25. Martirano v. Frost, 25 N.Y.2d 505, 508, 255 N.E.2d 693, 694, 307 N.Y.S.2d 425, 427
(1969) (assertion must be so completely irrelevant that its only possible purpose is to defame the
person about whom it is said).
26. Seltzer v. Fields, 20 A.D.2d 60, 62-63, 244 N.Y.S.2d 792, 795-96 (Ist Dep't 1963), aftd,
14 N.Y.2d 624, 198 N.E.2d 368, 249 N.Y.S.2d 174 (1964); Johnston v. Schlarb, 7 Wash. 2d 528,
536, 110 P.2d 190, 195 (1941).
27. Hoar v. Wood, 44 Mass. 193, 194 (1841); Youmans v. Smith, 153 N.Y. 214, 218-21, 476
N.E. 265, 266-67 (1897); see Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 442 (1976) (White, J.,
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that the prosecutor be given wide latitude in exercising his trial-related
discretion, 28 even though the individual's interest in protecting his reputation
may thereby be forfeited.
29
Absolute immunity shields the prosecutor's motives from review in a civil
damage action regardless of the maliciousness of his conduct. 30 Consequently,
although it encourages the exercise of unbiased decisionmaking, absolute
immunity simultaneously shields prosecutors who have misused their author-
ity. The victim may therefore endure injury without the right of redress. 3 1
Furthermore, by cloaking the prosecutor with absolute rather than qualified
immunity, the courts have eliminated a potential deterrent of intentionally
abusive conduct.3 2 In balancing "the evils inevitable in either alternative,
[however, it was] thought in the end better to leave unredressed the
wrongs done by dishonest officers than to subject those who try to do their
duty to the constant dread of retaliation. '33 In theory, at least, the prosecutor
would not be unpunished because he is always subject to criminal sanctions.3 4
concurring) (emphasizing that in defamation cases encouragement of disclosure is the "single
justification" for immunity). See generally Veeder, Absolute Immunity in Defamation: Judicial
Proceedings, 9 Colum. L. Rev. 463 (1909). Abuse of this privilege is tempered by the judge's
constant scrutiny of all participants in the trial and by the criminal sanctions for perjury. 1 F.
Harper & F. James, supra note 18, § 5.22, at 424.
28. Sacks v. Stecker, 60 F.2d 73, 75 (2d Cir. 1932) (absolute immunity granted to protect the
honest advocate although defamatory words should be actionable); Maulsby v. Reifsnider, 69
Md. 143, 151, 14 A. 505, 505 (1888) (It is "absolutely essential to the administration of justice that
he should be allowed the widest latitude in commenting on the character, the conduct, and
motives of parties and witnesses and other persons directly or remotely connected with the
subject-matter in litigation").
29. Maulsby v. Reifsnider, 69 Md. 143, 151, 14 A. 505, 506 (1888); Hoar v. Wood, 44 Mass.
193, 194 (1841). See generally Veeder, supra note 27.
30. Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396, 406 (2d Cir. 1926); Maulsby v. Reifsnider, 69 Md. 143, 151,
14 A. 505, 506 (1888); cf. Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347 (1871) (judges).
31. Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950);
see Keefe, Personal Tort Liability of Administrative Officials, 12 Fordham L. Rev. 130, 130-31
(1943). For example, the prosecutor who purposefully commences an action to harass his victim
can cause much inconvenience and force him to bear the needless financial burden of defending a
groundless charge without having to make reparations. Judicial Officers, supra note 2, at 329
n.45. In Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950), the
result of the alleged misconduct was far more serious. Arrested as an enemy alien, the German
cothplainant was incarcerated for almost five years despite the Enemy Alien Hearing Board's
determination that he was a Frenchman. Id. at 579.
32. Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950); 2
F. Harper & F. James, supra note 18, at 1641-42.
33. 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950). It has been argued
that the fear of groundless suits unduly biasing official discretion is unrealistic because today It Is
more usual for the state treasury to pay a judgment against the prosecutor or to indemnify him If
he pays in the first instance. Jaffe, supra note 14, at 231.
34. At common law, courts often reasoned that punishment of government officials was
properly left to the public, or their representatives, rather than to private individuals. See, e.g.,
Pugach v. Klein, 193 F, Supp. 630, 635 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Smith v. Parman, 101 Kan. 115,
116-17, 165 P. 663, 663-64 (1917); Watts v. Gerking, 111 Or. 654, 670, 228 P. 135, 141 (1924).
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B. Section 1983 and Imbler v. Pachtman
Relying on the broad remedial purpose of the Civil Rights Acts, 3s and the
silence of section 1983 on the applicability of the common law immunities, 36
several early courts literally construed section 1983 to authorize suit against
every person who infringed another's constitutional rights while acting under
color of state law.37 The Supreme Court, however, focused on common law
considerations and the ambiguity of the legislative history and incorporated
the traditional immunities of legislators, 38 judges, 39 and police officers40 into
section 1983.
Nevertheless, not all officials have been accorded the same immunity to
which they were entitled at common law. In Scheuer v. Rhodes,4 the Court
held that executive officials, who were absolutely immune at common law, 42
35. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 173-74 (1961); Cong. Globe, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess.
app. 68 (1871) (remarks of Rep. Shellabarger). 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976), derived from the Ku
Klux Klan Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13, 13 (1871), was enacted in response to the
lawlessness that existed in the south after the Civil War, and because "through tacit complicity
and deliberate inactivity, state and local officials were fostering [Klan] vigilante terrorism against
politically active blacks and Union sympathizers." Developments, supra note 2, at 1153 (footnote
omitted). Although § 1 was created to remedy the plight of southern blacks, its supporters
intended that it be available to all persons deprived of their constitutional rights by those
endowed with state authority. Cong. GloLe, 42nd Cong., ist Sess. app. 68 (1871) (remarks of
Rep. Shellabarger); see Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 683 (1978), The §
1983 claimant need not first resort to an available state remedy; the federally-created right is
supplemental to state law. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. at 183; see Cong. Globe, 42nd Cong., 1st
Sess. 334-35, app. 216 (1871) (remarks of Rep. Hoar and Sen. Thurman).
36. See note 4 supra.
37. See Picking v. Pennsylvania R.R., 151 F.2d 240, 250 (3d Cir. 1945) ("the conclusion is
irresistible that Congress by enacting the Civil Rights Acts sub judice intended to abrogate the
privilege to the extent indicated by that act and in fact did so"), overruled, Bauers v. Heisel, 361
F.2d 581 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1021 (1967); accord, McShane v. Moldovan, 172
F.2d 1016 (6th Cir. 1949); Burt v. City of New York, 156 F.2d 791 (2d Cir. 1946). See also
Littleton v. Berbling, 468 F.2d 389, 409 (7th Cir. 1972) (noting the ambiguous legislative history).
38. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951). Legislative immunity is rooted in English
law, see id. at 372-76, and is well established in the United States. Id.; Kilbourn v. Thompson,
103 U.S. 168, 201-05 (1880); Tanner v. Gault, 20 Ohio App. 243, 245-46, 153 N.E. 124, 125,
(1925). It is generally agreed that the 42nd Congress did not intend to overturn legislative
immunity. See Developments, supra note 2, at 1200. But see Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367,
381-83 (1951) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
39. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967). Commentators have argued that Congress never
intended that judges be immune from suit. See Developments, supra note 2, at 1201-02
(statements of several Congressmen that judicial officers could incur liability were never cor-
rected); Note, The Proper Scope of the Civil Rights Acts, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1285, 1296 (1953)
(same) [hereinafter cited as Proper Scope]. Continuing judicial immunity under § 1983 has been
justified by the theory that the universal acceptance of the doctrine at common law requires
specific Congressional reversal. It has been argued, however, that judicial immunity was not, in
fact, firmly entrenched in the common law. Judicial Officers, supra note 2, at 325-27.
40. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (good faith and probable cause defense).
41. 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
42. See Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959) (acting director of the Office of Rent Stabilization
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are only entitled to a qualified immunity based on "the existence of reasonable
grounds for the belief formed at the time and in light of all the circumstances,
coupled with a good-faith belief" that their behavior complied with constitu-
tional constraints.4 3 After Scheuer, prosecutors, who are also characterized
as executive officers,44 can only be granted absolute immunity on the basis of
their judicial functions. 45
The Supreme Court directly addressed the issue of prosecutorial immunity
under section 1983 in Imbler v. Pachtman,"6 in which the plaintiff al-
leged that the California deputy district attorney had willfully or negligently
suppressed evidence favorable to the defense and had allowed an eyewitness,
whom he knew or should have known was committing perjury, to testify. 47
alleged to have released libelous press statement); Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896)
(Postmaster General charged with breach of contract).
43. 416 U.S. at 247-48. In Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959), the Court reasoned that, if the
government official was entitled only to a qualified immunity, suits brought would consume time
and energy otherwise devoted to public service and the threat of these suits would inhibit
effective policy administration. Id. at 571. The Court, therefore, held that government officials
are absolutely immune. Id. at 574. Although Scheuer held that executive officials sued under §
1983 have only qualified immunity, the decision was based on the same policy considerations as
Barr. 416 U.S. at 239-40, 246-47. Recently, in Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978), the Court
held that federal executives charged with unconstitutional conduct are entitled only to the
Scheuer qualified immunity. Id. at 507.
44. See, e.g., Pearson v. Reed, 6 Cal. App. 2d 277, 44 P.2d 592 (1935) (granting absolute
immunity based on both the quasi-judicial and executive status of the prosecutor); ABA Project
on Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to the Prosecution Function and the
Defense Function § 1.1 (a), (b), at 25 (1971) [hereinafter cited as ABA Standards].
45. See, e.g., Walker v. Cahalan, 542 F.2d 681, 685 (6th Cir. 1976) (prosecutor's letter to
newspaper deemed executive activity although not quasi-judicial), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 966
(1977); Donovan v. Reinbold, 433 F.2d 738, 743 (9th Cir. 1970) (lawyer giving advice unrelated
to pending litigation not quasi-judicial).
46. 424 U.S. 409 (1976). In 1927, the Court had summarily affirmed the Second Circuit's
determination that a special assistant to the United States Attorney General was absolutely
immune from a malicious prosecution action. Yaselli v. Goff, 275 U.S. 503 (1927), qff'g per
curiam 12 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1926). Yaselli was decided when federal executive officials were
generally immune from suit. See, e.g., Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896); Kendall v. Stokes,
44 U.S. (3 How.) 87 (1845); Mellon v. Brewer, 18 F.2d 168 (D.C. Cir. 1927). For this reason and
because of subsequent limitations on the immunity in § 1983 suits, see Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416
U.S. 232 (1974), one commentator has noted that it was not strong precedent for absolute
prosecutorial immunity. Quasi-Judicial Immunity, supra note 14, at 106-07.
47. 424 U.S. at 416. Imbler was convicted of first-degree murder, primarily because of
testimonial identification by an eyewitness. People v. Imbler, 57 Cal.2d 711, 714, 371 P.2d 304,
306, 21 Cal. Rptr. 568, 570-71 (1962) (en banc). The Supreme Court of California unanimously
affirmed the trial verdict and death penalty. Id. at 718, 371 P.2d at 308, 21 Cal. Rptr. at 572.
Shortly before the scheduled execution, however, Deputy District Attorney Pachtman informed
the governor that he had discovered new evidence that supported Imbler's alibi and discredited
the identification testimony. 424 U.S. at 412-13. Although the California Supreme Court
unanimously denied Imbler's subsequent petition for a writ of habeas corpus, In re Imbler, 60
Cal. 2d 554, 570, 387 P.2d 6, 15, 35 Cal. Rptr. 293, 303 (1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 908
(1964), the federal district court, granted the writ relying solely on the state court records. Imbler
v. Craven, 298 F. Supp. 795, 812 (C. D. Cal. 1969), aff'd sub nom. Imbler v. California, 424
F.2d 631 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 865 (1970). The court found numerous instances of
misconduct, including both the subornation of perjury by Pachtman and the suppression of
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Following earlier decisions that had applied tort immunities and defenses to
section 1983,48 the Court held the prosecutor to be absolutely immune from
charges concerned with "initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State's
case"49-- charges analagous to common law malicious prosecution and defa-
mation.50 This holding was in accord with the vast majority of lower court
decisions that had provided absolute immunity for these activities because of
their integral relationship with the judicial system."s
The Imbler Court first considered the potential negative effect a denial of
absolute immunity would have on the prosecutor's function as state advocate.
The primary concerns were the same as the common law justifications for
immunity-the deflection of time and energy from the prosecutor's public
duties that the need to defend private lawsuits would cause and the prejudi-
cial effect of these suits on his discretionary activities. -" The Court also
recognized two practical consequences that could result from a denial of
absolute immunity. First, because of the large volume of cases he annually
presents,5 3 as well as his adversarial relationship with the defendant, 54 the
prosecutor would have far more difficulty than other government officials in
satisfying the good faith requirement of qualified immunity. s Concurrently,
his often pressing need to make quick decisions based on insufficient informa-
tion could lead to colorable claims of abuse.5 6
evidence favorable to Imbler's defense. Id. at 803. When Imbler was not retried within sixty
days, in accordance with the district court order, the writ of habeas corpus issued and he was
finally released. 424 U.S. at 415.
48. 424 U.S. at 418 (citing Tenney v. Brandove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951)). see Wood v
Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1969), notes 14-16 supra and
accompanying text.
49. 424 U.S. at 431.
50. See notes 20-29 supra and accompanying text.
51. See, e.g., Taylor v. Nichols, 558 F.2d 561 (10th Cir. 1977) (failure to initiate followed by
decision to initiate); Tyler v. Witkowski, 511 F.2d 449 (7th Cir. 1975) (decision to initiate);
Scolnick v. Lefkowitz, 329 F.2d 716 (2d Cir.) (failure to initiate), cert. denied, 379 U S. 82S
(1964); Kostal v. Stoner, 292 F.2d 492 (10th Cir. 1961) (conspiracy with judge to deprive plaintiff
of fair trial), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 868 (1962). But see Holton v. Boman, 493 F.2d 1176 (7th Cir-
1974) (refusal to initiate suit held actionable); Dacey v. New York County Lawyer's Ass'n, 423
F.2d 188 (2d Cir. 1969) (association treated as public prosecutor, denied absolute immunity for
decision to initiate trial), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 929 (1970).
52. 424 U.S. at 423-26. The Court pointed out that the detrimental effects of threatened
§ 1983 suits and common law actions are the same. Id. at 427.
53. Id. at 426. But see Quasi-Judicial Immunity, supra note 14, at 97 n. 11 (recognizing
that the numerosity of potential claims has never been a distinguishing factor in immunity cases)-
54. Id. at 425 "[A] defendant will often transform his resentment at being prosecuted into the
ascription of improper and malicious actions to the State's advocate," Id. (citations omitted);
accord, Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949). cert. denied, 339 U S. 949 (1950);
cf. Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 347 (1871) (judge).
55. 424 U.S. at 425. The Court emphasized that it would be extremely difficult for the
prosecutor to prove the technical elements of a qualified immunity to a jury. Id. One commen-
tator has contended that "[tlhe strongest reason for judicial immunity may lie in the uncertainties
of the fact-finding process: suits might force a defendant judicial officer to attempt an explanation
of his mental processes in a particular case," but specifically recognized that this argument also
applies to police officers. Judicial Officers, supra note 2, at 333-34 (footnote omitted)
56. 424 U.S. at 425-26.
1118 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48
The Court then examined the direct consequences that a grant of limited
immunity would have on the criminal justice system. It found the desirability
of having all relevant evidence available to the jury to be of paramount
importance.5 7 Because amenability to suit could induce the prosecutor to
withhold questionable, yet possibly valuable, evidence and to hesitate to
commence an action, the criminal justice system and the public interest would
suffer.58 Various post-trial corrective mechanisms, such as appellate review
and habeas corpus proceedings, could also be jeopardized.5 9 The reviewing
judge or tribunal might be reluctant to find a violation of the defendant's
constitutional rights if a prosecutor could be held financially responsible. 60
In determining that these considerations outweigh the injured person's right
to redress under section 1983,61 the Imbler Court emphasized the alternative
sanctions that are provided for official misconduct 62 in criminal law63 and in
the American Bar Association (ABA) Canons. 6" It overlooked, however, the
57. Id. at 426. This concern parallels the rationale underlying the decision to immunize
participants in the judicial process from defamation suits. See note 27 supra and accompanying
text.
58. 424 U.S. at 426 & n.24. An error in judgment might not be brought to the attention of the
court. Justice White noted in his concurring opinion that "[there is no one to sue the prosecutor
for an erroneous decision not to prosecute." Id. at 438 (White, J., concurring) (emphasis In
original). The potential check on abuse effected by judicial safeguards-the overseeing judge and
the deliberative jury-would be completely lacking.
59. Id. at 427.
60. Id. at 427-28. The Court noted that such a result might occur even without the reviewing
judge's awareness. "This focus [on doing justice] should not be blurred by even the subconscious
knowledge" of the judge. Id. at 427.
61. Id. at 427-28. Commentators agree that the prosecutor should not be held financially
accountable for honest errors in judgment. See Developments, supra note 2, at 1204; Judicial
Officers, supra note 2, at 322. Nevertheless, there has been considerable controversy concerning
the shield of absolute immunity that is afforded the dishonest prosecutor. Many argue that a
qualified immunity is necessary to deter reprehensible conduct by those most able to engage in it
and that it would sufficiently protect the public's interest in an independent judiciary. See, e.g.,
Developments, supra note 2, at 1202-04; Quasi-Judicial Immunity, supra note 14, at 112-18; 47
Miss. L.J. 812, 820 (1976) (actual malice standard). The counter argument is that the claim In the
pleadings in a civil suit could always be phrased to charge the prosecutor with malice and that It
is the threat of suit itself, rather than possible liability, that would impede impartial decision-
making. See, e.g., Proper Scope, supra note 39, at 1298; Note, Delimiting the Scope of
Prosecutorial Immunity from Section 1983 Damage Suits, 52 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 173, 190-91 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Delimiting the Scope]. See also Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 n.33
(1976).
62. 424 U-S. at 428-29; see Civil Rights Improvements Act of 1977: Hearings on S. 35 Before
the Subcomm. on the Const. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 39
(1978) (remarks of Assistant Attorney General Days) [hereinafter cited as 1978 Hearings];
Delimiting the Scope, supra note 61, at 203.
63. The criminal counterpart of § 1983 provides that those acting under color of state law
who deprive others of their constitutional rights "shall be fined not more than $1,000 or
imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and if death results shall be subject to imprisonment
for any term of years or for life." 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1976). Criminal proceedings may also be
brought under state law. See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code § 127 (West 1970); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 268,
§§ 1-2 (Michie/Law. Co-op 1968); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 450.426 (1968).
64. ABA Code of Professional Responsibility EC 7-13, EC 7-26, DR 1-101, DR 4-101, DR
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scarcity of criminal or professional disciplinary actions brought against pros-
ecutors in the past. 65
Because the Imbler Court reasoned that the challenged activities were
intimately related to the trial proceeding, it did not delineate the boundaries
of the immunity.66 Thus, no guidelines were offered to separate investigative
from prosecutorial functions-a distinction that has shifted within6 ' and
7-107 (1976); ABA Standards, supra note 44, §§ 1.1(c), Commentary at 44, 3.1(b), Commentary at
78, 3.5(b), Commentary at 88, 3.11(a)&(c), Commentary at 100. 102. "[A] prosecutor stands
perhaps unique, anpng officials whose acts could deprive persons of constitutional rights, in his
amenability to professional discipline by an association of his peers." Imbler v. Pachtman, 424
U.S. at 429 & n.30 (footnote omitted).
65. The true value of such sanctions as punishment and deterrents of misconduct is question-
able. The specific intent requirement of § 242 is difficult to prove. The result is often a choice
between an acquittal, which may engender "disrespect for the criminal provisions at issue and for
the rule of law generally," and the decision not to prosecute, which "allows persons to act with
impunity." Comment, Legislating Civil Rights: The Role of Sections 241 and 242 in the
Revised Criminal Code, 63 Geo. L.J. 203, 217 (1974). But see Note, Discretion to Prosecute
Federal Civil Rights Crimes, 74 Yale L.J. 1297, 1300 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Discretion to
Prosecute] (even one highly publicized acquittal has a deterrent effect). In fact, only one § 242
criminal action has been instituted against a prosecutor. See United States v. Hunter, 214 F.2d
356 (5th Cir. 1954); 1978 Hearings, supra note 62, at 66 (statement of Sen. Howard M.
Metzenbaum). This may be attributed to the prosecutor's reluctance to bring suits against his
peers and his discretion in deciding whether or not to initiate them. Foote, Tort Remedies for
Police Violations ofindividual Rights, 39 Minn. L. Rev. 493, 493-94 (1955); see United States v.
Cox, 342 F.2d 167 (5th Cir.) (holding that a prosecutor has the discretionary authority to refuse to
commence an action despite grand jury indictment of the accused), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935
(1965). Additional factors include sympathetic juries and the difficulty of discovering evidence.
Discretion to Prosecute, supra, at 1298-1300. See generally Shapiro, Limitations In Prosecuting
Civil Rights Violations, 46 Cornell L.Q. 532 (1961). Furthermore, the ABA has recognized that it
has been "woefully lax in enforcing its professed ethical standards." ABA Standards, supra note
44, at 10.
66. 424 U.S. at 430-31.
67. The Third Circuit has undergone the most noticeable changes in its approach to
prosecutorial immunity. In Picking v. Pennsylvania R.R., 151 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1945), the court
held that the Civil Rights Act had eliminated judicial immunity. The court subsequently
overruled Picking, however, and held that the prosector's office is immune under § 1983. Bauers
v. Heisel, 361 F.2d 581 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1021 (1967): see note 94 infra.
Later, the court distinguished between the various functions performed by the prosecutor and the
proper degree of immunity. See, e.g., Jennings v. Shuman, 567 F.2d 1213 (3d Cir. 1977); Sprague
v. Fitzpatrick, 546 F.2d 560 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 937 (1977); Waits v.
McGowan, 516 F.2d 203 (3d Cir. 1975); accord, Austin v. Manlin, 433 F. Supp. 648 (E.D. Pa.
1977); Tomko v. Lees, 416 F. Supp. 1137 (W.D. Pa. 1976). The district courts utilized the
functional approach to distinguish the investigatory from the adversarial activities of the
prosecutor. This led to contradictory determinations. Compare Gockley v. Van Hoove, 409 F.
Supp. 645, 650-51 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (absolutely immune for press release although the court
recognized that such conduct was not exclusively adversarial) with Coggins v. Carpenter, 486 F.
Supp. 270, 283-84 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (allowing trial judge to determine whether acting within or
without scope of his jurisdiction) and J.D. Pflaumer, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Justice, 450 F.
Supp. 1125, 1135 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (denial of immunity to prosecutor who ordered the seizure of
records even though it appeared that the criminal action had already been initiated). In 1979, the
Third Circuit held that when investigations are necessary to enhance the discretion of the
prosecutor, they are protected activities. Forsyth v. Kleindienst, 599 F.2d 1203, 1215 (3d Cir.
1979).
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among the circuit courts. 68 The Court, however, recognized the lower court
decisions that used a functional approach 69 to hold that a prosecutor acting in
an investigatory capacity is entitled only to the good faith and probable cause
defense afforded the police officer. 70 It acknowledged that at a certain point
the prosecutor's function more closely resembles that of the administrator or
investigator than that of the advocate. The Court noted that "[p]reparation,
both for the initiation of the criminal process and for a trial, may require the
obtaining, reviewing, and evaluating of evidence," ' 7 1 indicating that absolute
immunity might also protect other activities.
Although the majority explicitly declined to exclude unconstitutional sup-
pression from the general coverage afforded the prosecutor's handling of a
criminal prosecution, 72 the three concurring justices maintained that absolute
immunity does not protect the suppression of exculpatory evidence. 73 In his
68. Compare Heidelberg v. Hammer, 577 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1978) (absolute immunity from
false arrest charges) and Martinez v. Chavez, 574 F.2d 1043 (10th Cir. 1978) (same) and Atkins v.
Lanning, 556 F.2d 485 (10th Cir. 1977) (prosecutor immune for investigations connected to
preparation and presentation of case) with Jacobson v. Rose, 592 F.2d 515 (9th Cir. 1978) (Illegal
wiretap qualifiedly immune), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 2861 (1979) and Robichaud v. Ronan, 351
F.2d 533 (9th Cir. 1965) (no absolute immunity for false arrest and coercion of confession) and
Peterson v. Stanczak, 48 F.R.D. 426 (N.D. II. 1969) (illegal search and seizure and false arrest
not immune).
69. See, e.g., Guerro v. Mulhearn, 498 F.2d 1249, 1256 (1st Cir. 1974); Hampton v. City of
Chicago, 484 F.2d 602 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 917 (1974); Robichaud v. Ronan,
351 F.2d 533 (9th Cir 1965).
70. See, e.g., Whirl v. Kern, 407 F.2d 781, 787-89 (5th Cir. 1969); Joseph v. Rowlen, 402
F.2d 367, 370 (7th Cir. 1968); Notaras v. Ramon, 383 F.2d 403, 404 (9th Cir. 1967).
71. 424 U.S. at 431 n.33.
72. Id. at 431 n.34. The majority gave three reasons for refusing to accept Justice White's
argument. First, it found that suppression of evidence is as much a violation of an individual's
rights as is subornation of perjury. Id. This reasoning is deficient in two respects. Allowing a
prosecutor to present evidence without fear of potential suit puts the ultimate burden on the jury
to determine if it is valid. Thus, more information will be released. Id. at 446 n.9 (White, J.,
concurring). A denial of immunity for suppression, however, would achieve this beneficial effect.
Moreover, when individual rights are at stake, only those activities that benefit the judicial
system should be protected. Second, the Court felt that the distinction was impossible to apply
because a charge of perjury could easily be recast as suppression. Id. at 431 n.34. Justice White
pointed out, however, that it is fairly easy to assert subornation of perjury, but much more
difficult to allege the objective facts necessary to establish that the prosecutor unconstitutionally
withheld evidence. Id. at 446 n.9 (White, J., concurring). Finally, the majority charged that the
test of disclosure formulated was more demanding than that required by Brady v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 83 (1963). 424 U.S. at 431 n.34. Justice White expressly rejected that notion. Id. at 446 n.9
(White, J., concurring).
73. 424 U.S. at 433 (White, J., concurring) (Brennan, J., & Marshall, J., joining). The
Justices concurred with the inajority because they viewed the subornation of perjury as the crux
of the alleged offense. Id. at 432, 445-47 (White, J., concurring). Prior to Imbler, a number of
lower courts had denied absolute immunity to prosecutors who had suppressed evidence favorable
to the defendant. See Hilliard v. Williams, 465 F.2d 1212, 1218 (6th Cir.) (suppression of FBI
laboratory report supporting the defense), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1029 (1972); Haaf v. Grams, 355
F. Supp 542, 545 (D. Minn. 1973) (withholding evidence outside jurisdiction); Peterson v.
Stanczak, 48 F.R.D. 426 (N.D. Ill. 1969) (suppression within investigative role of prosecutor).
See also Weathers v. Ebert, 505 F.2d 514, 516 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 975 (1976).
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concurring opinion, Justice White argued that trial disclosure 74 -an accepted
justification for absolute immunity 7 -would only be encouraged by denying
the prosecutor such immunity. 76 He reasoned that the judicial process would
be improved by the limited grant of qualified immunity because the pros-
ecutor would be inclined to present information in his possession when he is
uncertain as to its materiality. 77 Finally, he noted that the opportunity for
judicial scrutiny and review is entirely lacking because unconstitutionally
suppressed information will rarely be discovered. 78 This underscores the need
to deter such behavior by permitting federal causes of action when suppressed
evidence is discovered. 79 Thus, the concurrence intimates that when the
prosecutor exercises his discretion in areas devoid of judicial safeguards,
permitting him to be brought to trial will provide the deterrent effect on
future prosecutorial abuse that is otherwise lacking.
C. Butz v. Economou
Butz v. Econonou ° is the most recent Supreme Court decision to analyze
the factors relevant to immunity determinations. Reasoning that Department
74. 424 U.S. at 443. The prosecutor has an affirmative duty to disclose material exculpatory
evidence to the defense. Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 150 (1972); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S.
150 (1972); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959). To ensure that the defendant's due process
rights are not violated, this information must be disclosed when requested by the defense, Brady
v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87-88 (1963), and when the omission would create "a reasonable doubt
[as to the defendant's innocence] that did not otherwise exist." United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S.
97, 112 (1976).
75. Both the majority, 424 U.S. at 426 & n.23, and the concurrence, id. at 442-43 (White, J.,
concurring) recognized this.
76. Id. at 443 (White, J., concurring).
77. Id. A prosecutor intent on protecting himself from potential liability could not injure the
judicial system by disclosing too much information. Id. The Court in United States v. Agurs, 427
U.S. 97 (1976), also recognized that the standard it had formulated would encourage the
prosecutor to disclose evidence of doubtful materiality. Id. at 108. As Justice White emphasized
in Imbler, 424 U.S. at 446 n.9, however, the Agurs Court stressed that only omissions that
interfered with the defendant's right to a fair trial would be unconstitutional. 427 U.S. at 108.
78. 424 U.S. at 443-44 (Vhite, J., concurring). The prosecutor in Imbler actually did come
forward with evidence that had been withheld. Id. at 412. For this reason, the majority argued
that the grant of absolute protection would encourage such behavior. Id. at 427 n.25; see 31
Vand. L. Rev. 196, 207 (1978). Justice White's standard, however, would deter such behavior in
the first instance.
79. 424 U.S. at 444 (Vhite, J., concurring). The proposed Civil Rights Improvements Act of
1977, S. 35, 95th Cong., Ist Sess., 123 Cong. Rec. S205 (daily ed. Jan. 10, 1977), included this
standard in a modified form. The exceptions to prosecutorial immunity in S. 35 were much
broader than those advocated by Justice White and exceeded the constitutional duty to disclose
evidence enunciated by the Court. Under S. 35 a prosecutor could be brought to trial under §
1983 if he suppressed either evidence or investigative leads. In Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786,
795 (1972), the Supreme Court stated that there is "no constitutional requirement that the
prosecution make a complete and detailed accounting to the defense of all police investigatory
work on a case." The proposed bill was vigorously contested on this point. 1978 Hearings, supra
note 62, at 121-22 (statement of Louis J. Lefkowitz), 352-54 (statement of Lee C. Flake), 355-56
(testimony of D. Lueell Jensen), 362-63 (statement of Andrew L. Sonner). In 1979, S. 35 was
resubmitted as S. 1983, 96th Cong., 1 Sess., 125 Cong. Rec. SIS991 (daily ed. Nov. 6. 1979)
excluding the provisions relating to prosecutorial immunity.
80. 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
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of Agriculture officials who had conducted an administrative hearing exercised
discretion similar to that of judicial officers,81 the Court held them to be
absolutely immune.82 The Court was not required to determine whether
absolute prosecutorial immunity extends beyond the bounds it had previously
delineated in Imbler.8 3 The value of Butz, however, lies in its clarification of
the considerations upon which Imbler relied.
Using the adversary system as its model, 84 the Butz Court identified three
major factors to be balanced when deciding whether an official is entitled to
absolute or qualified immunity. First, the discretion of the prosecutor must be
related to adjudicatory proceedings.8 5 Second, the grant of absolute immunity
is only warranted when it is likely that, in its absence, the prosecutor will be
the target of retaliatory suits. 8 6 The Court found that in the context of trial
proceedings, he is especially amenable to suit because angry defendants will
often focus their resentment on him. 87 Finally, the Butz Court recognized that
81. Id. at 511. The Butz Court would limit the definition of quasi-judicial to encompass only
those judgments relating to adjudications functionally comparable to trial proceedings. See id. at
512-13. Because administrative hearings may differ, the "comparability" approach advanced by
Butz would require that each case be examined individually. E.g., Simons v. Bellinger, No.
77-2012, slip op. at 12 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 4, 1980); Forsyth v. Kleindienst, 599 F.2d 1203, 1212 (3d
Cir. 1979); Tigue v. Swaim, 585 F.2d 909, 914 (8th Cir. 1978).
82. 438 U.S. at 512-17. In Butz, Department of Agriculture officials had initiated and
conducted an administrative hearing to revoke or suspend the registration of a commodity futures
commission merchant. Id. at 481-85. This was the first time the Court examined the right of
executive officials to immunity when they are sued directly under the Constitution. The Butz
decision followed the line of cases that had granted qualified immunity to state executive officials
sued under § 1983, e.g., Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S.
232 (1974), rather than federal case law granting government officials absolute immunity. See
Barr v. Mateo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959); Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896). The Court found no
reason to differentiate between state and federal officials for the purposes of conferring immunity
because both § 1983 and implied causes of action under the Constitution would become
meaningless if officials were always immune when conducting themselves improperly. 438 U.S. at
500-01; see note 5 supra. The Court did not deny federal executive officials absolute immunity,
however, solely on the basis of their status or title. Rather, it placed the burden on them to prove
that public policy requires that they should be completely protected from suit in certain
situations. 438 U.S. at 506.
83. The officials in Butz were charged with having maliciously initiated the hearing In
response to the plaintiff's criticism of the Department. 438 U.S. at 482-83. This conduct falls
squarely within the Imbler immunity.
84. Id. at 512; accord, Apton v. Wilson, 506 F.2d 83, 93 (D.C. Cir. 1974) ("the
prosecutor's absolute protection, like that of the judge from which it is derived, is both justified
and bounded by the judicial traditions and procedures that limit and contain the danger of
abuse") (footnotes omitted).
85. 438 U.S. at 511-13.
86. Id. at 512. In Simons v. Bellinger, No. 77-2012 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 4, 1980), the District of
Columbia Circuit adopted this as the primary requisite to grant absolute immunity. id., slip op.
at 23 n.15; see notes 137-50 infra and accompanying text.
87. 438 U.S. at 512. As in Imbler, the Court emphasized the importance of encouraging
disclosure of evidence and noted that the prosecutor's handling of evidence could easily lead to
charges of misconduct. In the context of a government agency, the Court again stressed that
the public interest would be defeated if relevant evidence were withheld from those making policy
decisions. Id. at 517. At the same time, the Court specifically noted that the time and information
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safeguards must be available to deter the prosecutor from misusing his
authority.88 In contrast to its decision in Imbler, the Court focused on the
features of the judicial system that may effect this deterrence: challenges to his
assertions by defense counsel through cross-examination and rebuttal; scrutiny
of his decision to commence the action during the trial proceeding itself; and,
the jury's decision whether to accept the credibility of any evidence presented
for its deliberation.8 9 This focus on the availability of checks indicates that
the broad implications of the Imbler immunity are subject to limitation. 90
Only when there are adequate means to deter prosecutorial abuse will the
importance of ensuring independence of judgment and action outweigh the
risk of unconstitutional conduct.9
T1. SCOPE OF THE IMMUNITY
The variety of activities performed by the prosecutor intensifies the
difficulty in delineating the scope of prosecutorial immunity.9 2 The prerequis-
ite for immunity is that the prosecutor be acting within the scope of his
authorized powers at the time of his alleged misconduct. 93 An official who
constraints under which the prosecutor acts were not a central consideration in Imbler. Id. at 516
n.40.
88. Id. at 512. The court noted that it is these safeguards that guarantee the reliability and
impartiality of judicial decisionmaking. Id.
89. Id. at 516-17.
90. It has been noted that the Imbler Court's concern with the criminal enforcement system is
a radical departure from the traditional erophasis upon the nature of the prosecutor's role in the
judicial process, and that a much broader immunity can be justified on this basis. Note, Absolute
Immunity for Prosecutors; Too Broad a Protection: Imbler v. Pachtman, 10 Sw. U. L. Rev. 305,
315 (1978); Quasi-Judicial Immunity, supra note 14, at 97 n.l1; 47 Miss. L.J. 812, 819 (1976); see
Delimiting the Scope, supra note 61, at 200-01 (proposing that all prosecutorial investigations be
covered by absolute immunity).
91. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 514 (1978). Lower courts ignore this factor completely,
Atkins v. Lanning, 556 F.2d 485, 488 (10th Cir. 1977), give it only cursory attention, Forsyth v.
Kleindienst, 599 F.2d 1203, 1215 n.15 (3d Cir. 1979), or misinterpret its application. Briggs v.
Goodwin, 569 F.2d 10, 38-39 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Wilkey, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 904
(1978).
92. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Rose, 592 F.2d 515, 524 (9th Cir. 1978) (defining implementation of
wiretap as administrative), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 930 (1979); Taylor v. Nichols, 558 F.2d 561,
566 (10th Cir. 1977) (decision to prosecute within prosecutorial function); Sprague v. Fitzpatrick,
546 F.2d 560, 564 (3d Cir. 1976) (hiring and firing policies within administrative function), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 937 (1977); Palermo v. Warden, 545 F.2d 286, 297 (2d Cir. 1976) (plea-
bargaining within prosecutorial function), cert. dismissed, 431 U.S. 911 (1977); Hampton v. City
of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 608-09 (7th Cir. 1973) (evidence gathering within police function), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 917 (1974); 12 Ga. L. Rev. 322, 379 (1978); 31 Vand. L. Rev. 196, 198 (1978).
Seven categories of prosecutorial conduct have been identified. quasi-judicial, administrative,
ministerial, investigatory, civilladvisory, public official, and individual. Delimiting the Scope,
supra note 61, at 187-88.
93. See, e.g., Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978) (judge); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416
U.S. 232, 250 (1974) (executive official); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376-79 (1951)
(legislators). The classic example of an official exceeding these bounds is the probate court judge
who chooses to preside at criminal proceedings. Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 351-52
(1871). Analogously, a state district attorney attempting to prosecute a citizen for a federal offense
would 4iso be liable for his misconduct. Clark v. Zimmerman, 394 F. Supp. 1166, 1176 (M.D.
Pa. 1975).
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merely exceeds his granted authority, however, will not be affected by this
limitation. 94 Moreover, a prosecutor will be immune from suit9" even when
94. In Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871), the Supreme Court noted that "the
manner and extent in which the [judge's] jurisdiction shall be exercised" is precisely the judicial
discretion the immunity was created to protect. Id. at 352. Judicial immunity has traditionally
been broad. See Sparks v. Duval County Ranch Co., 604 F.2d 976, 980 (5th Cir. 1979). In Stump
v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978), for example, the Court found that a judge's ex parte order
allowing a minor to be sterilized without her consent was within his jurisdiction. Id. at 362-63.
Judges have, however, been found amenable to suit in certain circumstances. See, e.g., Lucarell
v. McNair, 453 F.2d 836 (6th Cir. 1972) (judge assaulted and incarcerated minor during traffic
violation proceedings); Spires v. Bottorf, 317 F.2d 273 (7th Cir. 1963) (judge interfered with
coram nobis proceeding after disqualifying himself), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 938 (1964).
The authority of the prosecutor is generally governed by statute. E.g., Cal. Gov't Code §§
26500-528 (1980) (District Attorney); id. § 12510 (Attorney General); N.Y. County Law § 700(1)
(McKinney 1972) (District Attorney); N.Y. Exec. Law § 63 (9)-(11) (McKinney 1972) (Attorney
General); see Jennings v. Shuman, 567 F.2d 1213, 1220-21 (3d Cir. 1977); Dacey v. New York
County Lawyers' Ass'n, 423 F.2d 188, 189-90 & n.3 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 929
(1970). Even though investigatory activities are not usually included in statutory grants of
authority, they are deemed within the proper scope of the prosecutor's jurisdiction. See Wilhelm
v. Turner, 298 F. Supp. 1335, 1338 (S.D. Iowa 1969), aff'd, 431 F.2d 177 (8th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 947 (1971); Meloling, Prosecutorial Investigations, in Pretrial Problems of the
Prosecutor 3-6 (J. Douglass ed. 1977). Despite the diversity of prosecutorial functions, some
courts reason that immunity attaches to the office of the prosecutor rather than the activities he
performs, and thus appear to impose no other limitations upon the immunity. See, e.g., Cambist
Films, Inc. v. Duggan, 475 F.2d 887, 889 (3d Cir. 1973) (seizure of allegedly obscene films);
Bauers v. Heisel, 361 F.2d 581, 591 (3d Cir. 1966) (juvenile tried in criminal court), cert. denied,
386 U.S. 1021 (1967); Gockley v. VanHoove, 409 F. Supp 645, 650 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (releasing
information to the press). Before the Supreme Court held that executive officials are entitled only
to qualified immunity in Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974), courts sometimes conferred
absolute immunity on prosecutors because of their positions as executive officials. See, e.g.,
United States v. Faneca, 332 F.2d 872 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 971 (1965); Norton
v. McShane, 332 F.2d 855 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 981 (1965). The distinction
between acting beyond the scope of official authority and merely in excess of that authority has
been criticized as meaningless and difficult to apply. E.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents, 456 F.2d 1339, 1343 (2d Cir. 1972); see National Sur. Co. v. Miller, 155 Miss. 115, 127,
124 So. 251, 254 (1929) ("We cannot grasp the conception that nonexistence can be less than
nonexistence, or that there can be different kinds of nonexistence, or that that which is absent can
be more absent."); McCormack & Kirkpatrick, Immunities of State Officials Under Section 1983,
8 Rut.-Cam. L.J. 65, 72-73 (1976); Note, Briggs v. Goodwin: The Constriction of Prosecutorial
Immunity, 15 Hous. L. Rev. 760, 763 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Constriction); But see 2 F.
Harper & F. James, supra note 18, § 29.10, at 1643. Bauers v. Heisel, 361 F.2d 581 (3d Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1021 (1967), emphasized the fine distinction between these
two concepts. In Bauers, the prosecutor tried an escaped juvenile offender in criminal court
although the New Jersey legislature had removed this duty from his authority. Id. at 583-84.
Nevertheless, the court held that because the prosecutor had fulfilled his foremost
responsibility-vindicating wrongs against society-he had not exceeded the bounds of his
jurisdiction. Id. at 591.
95. See, e.g., Briggs v. Goodwin, 569 F.2d 10, 15 (D C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 437 U.S.
904 (1978); cf. Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949) (common law malicious
prosecution action), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950); Cooper v. O'Connor, 99 F.2d 135, 140-41
(D.C. Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 643 (1938). If absolute immunity did not extend to any
charges of illegal behavior, even honest prosecutors would be subject to examination at trial.
Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950).
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he exercises that authority illegally. 9 6
Not every prosecutorial act that is within his authority, however, is
protected by absolute immunity. Most courts refine the basic jurisdiction
limitation by focusing on the challenged activity and granting absolute
immunity only when it is an integral part of the judicial process. 97 Those
activities that are directly connected with the system, such as presenting
evidence in court, will usually be deemed quasi-judicial and therefore com-
pletely protected. 98 Other functions, such as conducting wide-ranging investi-
gations99 and issuing press releases,' 00 will generally be covered only with the
96. Some early decisions had interpreted this limitation to restrict absolute immunity to acts
within the prosecutor's lawful authority. The implicit rationale was that the prosecutor who
breaks the law, and thus violates the public trust, is always without authority, and the grant of
absolute immunity can never be justified. See, e.g., Holton v. Boman, 493 F.2d 1176, 1179 (7th
Cir. 1974); Hilliard v. Williams, 465 F.2d 1212, 1217-18 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S, 1029
(1972); Madison v. Purdy, 410 F.2d 99, 102 (5th Cir. 1969); Lewis v. Brautigam, 227 F.2d 124,
128-29 (5th Cir. 1955); Palermo v. Rockefeller, 323 F. Supp. 478, 482 (S.D N.Y. 1971); cf.
Helstoski v. Goldstein, 552 F.2d 564, 566 (3d Cir. 1977) (ambiguous post-Inbler case holding that
libelous press releases were not in "proper performance" of prosecutor's functions); Norton v.
McShane, 332 F.2d 855, 866 (5th Cir. 1964) (Gewin, J., dissenting) (unlawful conduct can never
be within the scope of an official's authority), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 981 (1965). In Lewis v.
Brautigam, 227 F.2d 124 (5th Cir. 1955), for example, the Fifth Circuit found that the Florida
state prosecutor had conspired to coerce a guilty plea from a murder suspect. The court held that
the prosecutor was entitled to only a qualified immunity because his behavior was illegal,
although his actions would have been within his authority if properly executed. Id. at 128-29.
The court noted that police officers could be held liable for performing identical acts. Id. This
language was relied on by the court in Robichaud v. Ronan, 351 F.2d 533, 537 (9th Cir. 1965), to
represent the functional approach. See notes 114-16 infra and accompanying text. The court
would have reached the same result, therefore, had it analyzed the coercion of a guilty plea
within the Robichaud investigatory/advocacy context. See, e.g., Peterson v. Stanczak, 48 F.R.D.
426, 430-32 (N.D. 111. 1969).
97. See, e.g., Heidelberg v. Hammer, 577 F.2d 429, 432 (7th Cir. 1978) (alteration of police
tapes); Martinez v. Chavez, 574 F.2d 1043, 1044 (10th Cir. 1978) (arrest based on alleged
unfounded escape charge); Fine v. City of N.Y., 529 F.2d 70, 73-74 (2d Cir. 1975) (presenting
evidence to grand juries); Front Runner Messenger Serv., Inc. v. Ghini, 468 F. Supp. 305, 309
(N.D. 111. 1979) (using false testimony to obtain arrest warrant).
98. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-31 (1976); Ellison v. Stephens, 581 F.2d 584,
585 (6th Cir. 1978) (assertion of sovereign immunity defense); Fanale v. Sheehy, 385 F.2d 866 (2d
Cir. 1967) (initiation of suit and presentation of prosecution). But see Holton v. Boman, 493 F.2d
1176, 1179 (7th Cir. 1974) (requiring prosecutor to plead with respect to his decision not to initiate
a criminal case).
99. See, e.g., Guerro v. Mulhearn, 498 F.2d 1249, 1256 (1st Cir. 1974) (police related
activities); Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 608 (7th Cir. 1973) (illegal search), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 917 (1974); Wilhelm v. Turner, 431 F.2d 177, 180 (8th Cir, 1970) (illegal
seizure), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 947 (1971); Williams v. Wright, 432 F. Supp. 732, 740 (D. Or.
1976) (coerced confession); Ames v. Vavreck, 356 F. Supp. 931, 937 (D. Minn. 1973) (search and
seizure).
100. Hampton v. Hanrahan, 600 F.2d 600, 633 (7th Cir. 1979) (public relations), appeal
docketed, 48 U.S.L.W. 3415 (U.S. Jan. 1, 1980) (No. 79-912); Sprague v. Fitzpatrick, 546 F.2d
560, 564 (3d Cir. 1976) (hiring and firing policies); Walker v. Cahalan, 542 F.2d 681, 685 (6th
Cir. 1976) (press releases), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 966 (1977); Donovan v. Reinhold, 433 F.2d 738,
743 (9th Cir. 1970) (giving advice to administrative agency). But see Gockley v. VanHoove, 409
F. Supp. 645, 651 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (finding press releases to be one of the normal functions of
prosecutor's office and therefore protected).
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limited protection of qualified immunity. This distinction recognizes the
societal interest in allowing individuals redress when their constitutional
rights have been violated and concurrently in protecting the independent
discretion of the prosecutor. 10 Only when an activity is deemed quasi-judicial
will the scales tip in favor of immunizing the prosecutor from suit.102 The
cases, however, are inconsistent in their treatment of investigations underta-
ken in connection with a contemplated or commenced criminal proceeding.
Although some courts have denied immunity to these investigating pros-
ecutors,103 others include certain investigatory operations in immunity cov-
erage, 10 4 thereby extending its scope far beyond common law bounds.10s
A. The Functional Approach
Courts using the functional approach hold that the prosecutor is amenable
to suit when he engages in essentially police related activities. 10 6 They reason
that because the law enforcement officer is allowed only a qualified immunity
for his conduct,10 7 it would be illogical and unjust to afford a complete
defense to the prosecutor who undertakes similar tasks or orders their
performance.' 08 On this basis, prosecutors have been denied immunity for
101. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 437, 442, (1976) (White, 3., concurring); cf.
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 456 F.2d 1339, 1346 (2d Cir. 1972) (distinguishing
between ministerial and discretionary activities); Developments, supra note 2, at 835.
102. See, e.g., Briggs v. Goodwin, 569 F.2d 10, 33 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Wilkey, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 437 U.S. 904 (1978). See generally J.D. Pflaumer, Inc. v. United States Dep't of
Justice, 450 F. Supp. 1125, 1134 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
103. See, e.g., Robichaud v. Ronan, 351 F.2d 533, 536-37 (9th Cir. 1965); Lewis v.
Brautigam, 227 F.2d 124, 128-29 (5th Cir. 1955); J.D. Pflaumer, Inc. v. United States Dep't of
Justice, 450 F. Supp. 1125, 1133-34 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
104. See, e.g., Simons v. Bellinger, No. 77-2012, slip op. at 25 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 4, 1980)
(investigation protected by absolute immunity when related to decision to initiate particular case);
Forsyth v. Kleindienst, 599 F.2d 1203, 1215 (3d Cir. 1979) (investigatory activity subsumed
within the immunity if necessary to prosecutor's decision to initiate suit). It has been noted,
however, that "(miost lower court cases present a subtle and confused blend of these approaches."
McCormack & Kirkpatrick, supra note 94, at 91. It is necessarily arbitrary to determine when law
enforcement activities assume a judicial character. Briggs v. Goodwin, 569 F.2d 10, 21 (D.C.
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 904 (1978).
105. See pt. I(A) supra.
106. Robichaud v. Ronan, 351 F.2d 533, 536 (9th Cir. 1965); see Guerro v. Mulhearn, 498
F.2d 1249, 1256 (Ist Cir. 1974); Clark v. Lutcher, 436 F. Supp. 1266, 1272-73 (MD. Pa. 1977).
107. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555-59 (1967); Whirl v. Kern, 407 F.2d 781, 787-89 (1969);
Joseph v. Rowlen, 402 F.2d 367, 370 (1968); see Waits v. McGowan, 516 F.2d 203, 207 (3d Cir.
1975) (investigator employed by office of defense attorney immune for his evidence gathering
activities).
108. Guerro v. Mulhearn, 498 F.2d 1249, 1256 (1st Cir. 1974); Hampton v. City of Chicago,
484 F.2d 602, 608-09 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 917 (1974); see Clark v. Lutcher, 77
F.R.D. 415, 419 (M.D. Pa. 1977). The justification for according the prosecutor greater
protection than the police officer is that the prosecutor formulates strategy while the police officer
merely effectuates those decisions. McCormack & Kirkpatrick, supra note 94, at 66-67. When
there is only a small degree of judgment required, or if the central importance of the act is only
tangentially affected by that discretion, the act is deemed ministerial. Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 895D, Comment h (1979). The distinction has always been problematic, however,
because often the lowest ranked officials must choose between a variety of alternatives, Ham v.
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charges of illegal wiretaps,' 0 9 violent coercion of a guilty plea' 0 and false
arrest. I 1I
In Robichaud v. Ronan, 112 for example, the plaintiff alleged that the
prosecutor and deputy sheriff attempted to coerce the confession of a seven-
teen year old female murder suspect by confining her in a "drunk tank" for
twenty-five days without a preliminary hearing, forcing her to confront the
confessed murderer, and taking her to the scene of the crime without benefit
of counsel." 3 The court held that when the prosecutor surrenders his role as a
court officer by committing acts that are not quasi-judicial in nature, he is no
longer entitled to absolute immunity."
4
The logical result of such reasoning is that the prosecutor's role as advocate
never encompasses the investigative function. Even when his investigation
focuses on one particular suspect who he is preparing to indict or prosecute,
the prosecutor is characterized as a policeman, rather than as a prosecutor.,"3
There are several deficiencies in this approach. The prosecutor may legiti-
mately decide that he needs more information to arrive at a decision to bring
suit or to support his presentation of the case. 316 It is incorrect, therefore, to
conclude that the prosecutor abandons his adversarial role whenever he
participates in activities that other law enforcement officers also, and perhaps
more usually, perform. Furthermore, because this distinction depends on the
Los Angeles County, 46 Cal. App. 148, 162, 189 P. 462, 468 (1920) (en banc); see Constriction,
supra note 94, at 762-63; Freed, Executive Official Immunity for Constitutional l'iolation. An
Analysis and a Critique, 72 Nw. U.L. Rev. 526, 532 n.28 (1977).
109. Guerro v. Mulhearn, 498 F.2d 1249, 1256 (1st Cir. 1974).
110. Robichaud v. Ronan, 351 F.2d 533, 536-37 (9th Cir. 1965).
111. Williams v. Wright, 432 F. Supp. 732, 740-41 (D. Or. 1976).
112. 351 F.2d 533 (9th Cir. 1965).
113. Id. at 534-35.
114. Id. at 537. The court was concerned that § 1983 should not be overridden unless it was
absolutely necessary to do so. "[I]f immunities are broadly granted to state officers without
consideration of the nature of their alleged misdeeds and the reason for the immunity, the statute
becomes subject to circumvention, if not emasculation." Id. at 536; accord, Proper Scope, supra
note 39, at 1298. "If [the prosecutor] acts in the role of a policeman, then why should he not be
liable, as is the policeman, if, in so acting, he has deprived the plaintiff of rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Federal Constitution and laws? To us, it seems neither appropriate nor
justifiable that, for the same act, immunity should protect the one and not the other." 351 F.2d at
536-37 (citations omitted); see Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602 (7th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 917 (1974); Balistrieri v. Warren, 314 F. Supp. 824 (W.D. Wis. 1970). In
Hampton, the court held that the state prosecutor's planning of a raid upon Black Panther
members would not be cloaked with absolute prosecutorial immunity regardless of whether it was
characterized as an intentional execution or as obtaining of evidence relating to criminal activity.
484 F.2d at 608.
115. See Robichaud v. Ronan, 351 F.2d 533, 535-37 (9th Cir. 1965); Williams v. Wright, 432
F. Supp. 732, 740 (D. Or. 1976); cf. Wilhelm v. Turner, 431 F.2d 177, 180-83 (8th Cir. 1970)
(mentioning distinction, but holding prosecutor immune because he satisfied good faith require-
ment of qualified immunity), cert.- denied, 401 U.S. 947 (1971).
116. "A prosecutor, as the chief law enforcement official of his jurisdiction, ordinarily relies
on police and other investigative agencies for investigation of alleged criminal acts, but he has an
affirmative responsibility to investigate suspected illegal activity when it is not adequately dealt
with by other agencies." ABA Standards, supra note 44, § 3. l(a), at 76; see Pretrial Problems of
the Prosecutor 7 (J. Douglass ed. 1977).
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characterization of a particular activity, there is no identifiable standard on
which to base the grant of immunity. It has been argued, for example, that
the conduct the Robichaud court classified as investigative was "nothing more
than a grossly distorted version of plea bargaining," an activity typically
conducted by the prosecutor."1
7
B. Particularized Investigations
Recent decisions recognize that when the judicial process has already been
set in motion-for example, when a suspect has been identified or when the
grand jury has convened-certain investigative functions performed by the
prosecutor are within his role as advocate. ' t 8 Although some courts also
approve of the investigatory/advocacy dichotomy,' '9 they base their determi-
nations on whether the prosecutorial investigations are wide-ranging or
focused on a particular suspect.' 2 0 The courts reason that gathering evidence
for use in a particular criminal suit will facilitate the prosecutor's initial
decision whether to prosecute and his trial presentation. 121 Because this
quasi-judicial activity enhances the prosecutor's exercise of discretion, it is
viewed as beneficial to the functioning of the criminal justice system, 122
Limiting the immunity to situations in which the prosecutor has focused on
a particular case, however, does not provide clear guidelines for demarcating
the bounds of absolute immunity. Even when an investigation eventually
centers on a specific individual, it is often unclear whether it was commenced
117. Delimiting the Scope, supra note 61, at 198. The cogrts have generally not followed such
an interpretation. See, e.g., Dodd v. Spokane County, 393 F.2d 330, 335 (9th Cir. 1968);
Peterson v. Stanczak, 48 F.R.D. 426, 430-32 (N.D. II1. 1969).
118. See, e.g., Halperin v. Kissinger, 606 F.2d 1192, 1208 & n.110 (D.C. Cir. 1979), appeal
docketed, 48 U.S.L.W. 3467 (U.S. Jan. 22, 1980) (No. 79-880); Forsyth v. Kleindienst, 599 F.2d
1203, 1215 (3d Cir. 1979); Briggs v. Goodwin, 569 F.2d I0, 20-21 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
437 U.S. 904 (1978); Daniels v. Kieser, 586 F.2d 64, 68-69 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct
2050 (1979); Atkins v. Lanning, 556 F.2d 485, 488 (10th Cir. 1977).
119. E.g., Forsyth v. Kleindienst, 599 F.2d 1203, 121.4-15 (3d Cir. 1979); Daniels v. Kieser.
586 F.2d 64, 68-69 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 2050 (1979); Atkins v. Lanning, 556
F.2d 485. 488 (10th Cir. 1977); accord, Apton v. Wilson, 506 F.2d 83, 91, 93-94 (DC. Cir. 1974).
120. Briggs v. Goodwin, 569 F.2d 10, 20 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (referring to Imbler), cert. denied,
437 U.S. 904 (1978). The dissent in Briggs argues, however, that although examining a witness
before a grand jury would be "intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal
process ... [wlhen the prosecutor goes out to the residence of a potential witness and interrogates
him there, then he is functioning in . . . the role of an investigator." Id. at 45 (Wilkey, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis in original).
121. See, e.g., Simons v. Bellinger, No. 77-2012, slip op. at 22-23 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 4, 1980)
(investigation integral to the sensitive decision of whether to prosecute); Wilkinson v. Ellis. No.
77-869 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 21, 1980) (some investigations so closely tied to advocacy that to deny
protection would dilute prosecutorial immunity).
122. Forsyth v. Kleindienst, 599 F.2d 1203, 1217 (3d Cir. 1979); Daniels v. Kieser, 586 F,2d
64, 68 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 2050 (1979); Shifrin v. Wilson, 412 F, Supp. 1282,
1303 (D.D.C. 1976); cf. Waits v. McGowan, 516 F.2d 203, 207 (3d Cir. 1975) (investigator
employed by defense counsel absolutely immune for getting information to aid in defense of
accused). But see J.D. Pflaumer, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Justice, 450 F. Supp. 1125,
1134-35 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (prosecutor only qualifiedly immune for illegal seizure of records in
connection with grand jury indictment).
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solely on suspicion or because a prosecution was contemplated at its incep-
tion. Moreover, the distinction drawn between focused and wide-ranging
investigations can lead to anomalous results.
In Briggs v. Goodwin, '2 3 for example, the District of Columbia Circuit held
that a prosecutor who had falsely testified at a motion hearing that there were
no government informants among the witnesses subpoenaed for grand jury
invesdgation, was not absolutely immune. 124 Because the court found that the
perjured response occurred before any witnesses were targeted for indictment
and the testimony was solely in furtherance of a broad investigation, the court
classified the prosecutor as an investigator. "12- Although six members of the
group under investigation were indicted on the same day that the prosecutor
committed his offense, 12 6 the Briggs court concluded that the grand jury was
engaged in what was "fundamentally a fact-finding mission."' 12 7
The anomaly is that the very same act of the prosecutor would have been
deemed within his role as advocate2 2 had the witnesses previously been
identified as suspects. In dividing the investigative function of the grand jury
into two distinct stages-broad-scale and particularized-the court draws a
tenuous line between protected and unprotected behavior based solely on the
timing of the challenged activity. 2 9 The court appears to select an arbitrary
point at which the prosecutor's act is too far removed from the judicial
process to warrant immunity. 130 Integral to the judicial system is the dual
function of the grand jury-to hear evidence and then to indict. 3' These
123. 569 F.2d 10 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 904 (1978)
124. Id. at 13-16. The Briggs decision was the first time that a prosecutor had been granted
only a limited immunity for his conduct within a courtroom. Constriction, supra note 94, at 767-
125. 569 F.2d at 21, 22, 24-25.
126. Id. at 31 n.l1. The court determined that the function of the grand jury was investiga-
tive because many more members of the group were subpoenaed as witnesses than were ever
indicted; indictments were returned without the testimony of any of these witnesses; and, the
plaintiff was indicted three months after the investigation began. Id. at 24.
127. Id. at 23.
128. See Comment, Briggs v. Goodwin: Calling for a Reappraisal of Prosecutorial Immunity
from Constitutional Torts, 19 Wm. & Mfary L. Rev. 375, 390 (1977); 31 Vand. L. Rev. 196, 206
(1978). The court's analysis appears to be shaded by its knowledge that the prosecutor did, in
fact, commit perjury. It has been argued that, by denying absolute immunity for the suppression
of evidence necessary to the grand jury proceeding, the Briggs court actually adopted Justice
White's concurrence in Inmbler, despite the majority's disclaimer of this reasoning. See Constric.
tion, supra note 94, at 769.
129. The court expressly declined to base its decision on the fact that the grand jury had
already convened, stating that timing was not the determinative factor. 569 F.2d at 23.
Nevertheless, if the court had found that the prosecutor had targeted the witness for indictment,
he would have been immune from charges of perjury. See Constriction, supra note 94. at 768 &
n.77.
130. The court recognized that distinguishing between the investigative and advocacy func-
tions of the prosecutor was likely to "involve an element of arbitrariness." 569 F.2d at 21. It
justified its decision, however, on the ground that the prosecutor's response had no relation to
the decision to initiate or conduct a prosecution. Id.
131. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974) ("The scope of the grand jury's
powers reflects its special role in insuring fair and effective law enforcement."); Branzburg v-
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 700 (1972) ("the investigation of crime by the grand jury implements a
fundamental governmental role of securing the safety of the person and property of the citizen.").
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functions cannot be artificially subdivided. 132
Furthermore, the Briggs decision appears to be improper in light of the
considerations applied in Imbler and Butz in which the Court emphasized that
the prosecutor advocating in court is subject to judicial sanctions. 133 Although
the prosecutor responded to a judge's question in open court, the Briggs court
denied him absolute immunity because no safeguards had been imposed. 13 4
The court's analysis should have focused, however, on whether there were
available safeguards rather than whether each restraining influence had
actually been implemented. 135 In addition, the prosecutor's response brought
more information into the grand jury proceeding. The traditional concern
with encouraging disclosure, emphasized in Imbler, would mandate the
application of absolute immunity. 136
In Simons v. Bellinger, 137 the District of Columbia Circuit attempted to
clarify its approach to delimiting prosecutorial immunity. 138 Relying on Bultz,
the court characterized a court-appointed committee that was authorized to
investigate and prosecute individuals practicing law without a license, as
equivalent to a judicial officer. 139 Holding the committee immune, the court
distinguished the Briggs decision because it found that the committee was
contemplating the commencement of a suit against these particular plaintiffs
132. Briggs v. Goodwin, 569 F.2d 10, 42 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Wilkey, J., dissenting), cert.
denied, 437 U.S. 904 (1978); see National Ass'n of Attorneys General, Statewide Grand Juries 1
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Statewide Grand Juries]; National Lawyers Guild, Representation of
Witnesses Before Federal Grand Juries § 9.1, at 167 (rev. ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as Federal
Grand Juries].
133. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 428-29 (1976); see notes 88-91 supra and
accompanying text; Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 512 (1978).
134. 569 F.2d at 24-25. The court justified its decision by noting that the available judicial
and extrajudicial safeguards on abuse had not been implemented. Id. at 24-25. The hearing had
been conducted without a jury or cross-examination. Furthermore, even after the prosecutor's
perjury was discovered neither criminal penalties nor ABA penalties had been imposed. Id. at
23-24.
135. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 428-29 (1976). The Briggs court relied on an
earlier decision, Apton v. Wilson, 506 F.2d 83 (D.C. Cir. 1974), that had denied absolute
immunity because of the absence of arrest safeguards. In that case, the usual procedures were
completely suspended and no checks on abuse were available. Id. at 93-94.
136. The court reasoned, however, that answering a single question about an Investigation
did not render the prosecutor's conduct adversarial. 569 F.2d at 22. Although the court stated
that the federal courts have substituted the functional analysis for the ministerial/discretionary
approach, the court noted that the limited response of the prosecutor would properly have been
classified as ministerial. Id. at 16 n.7. The dissent argued that the prosecutor has assumed the
role of witness and should be immune from suit. Id. at 46-57 (Wilkey, J., dissenting). Federal
courts have generally extended common law witness immunity to federal damage causes of
action. E.g., Burke v. Miller, 580 F.2d 108, 109 (4th Cir. 1978); Brawer v. Horowitz, 535 F.2d
830, 836-37 (3d Cir. 1976).
137. No. 77-2012 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 4, 1980).
138. Id., slip op. at 2-6.
139. See id., slip op. at 9-12. The court reasoned that the committee was similar to a
prosecutor because it initiated and conducted trials and negotiated settlements. It also recognized
that a proper inquiry should consider the nature of the challenged activity. Id., slip op. at 12;
accord, Corsican Prods. v. Pitchess, 338 F.2d 441, 443-44 (9th Cir. 1964).
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at the time they conducted the investigation. 140 The investigation is par-
ticularized when a suspect and a particular wrong are identified; at this point,
the court considers the information sought to be connected with the decision
to prosecute.141 In addition, the prosecutor becomes a potential target for
harassing lawsuits.' 42 The Simons court also found procedural safeguards
available to check prosecutorial abuse: committee proceedings are charac-
teristically adversarial, overseen by a judge, and subject to review. 14 3 The
court, however, justified the grant of immunity on the basis of courtroom
restraints even though the alleged harassment actually occurred outside the
courtroom.44 This consideration would seem to be irrelevant to the court's
decision to grant absolute immunity because there were no safeguards present




Therefore, although the Simons court purported to balance the Butz factors,
it actually considered only the particularity of the investigation. ' 46 Despite the
factual inconsistencies regarding the committee's intention to prosecute, 47 the
court assumed that the identification of a suspect marks the initiation of the
action. Furthermore, granting the investigating prosecutor immunity is not
justified by arguing that a particular suspect is as likely to retaliate against the
prosecutor as is the defendant against the advocate. The threat of groundless
suits is particularly great in trial proceedings not only because the acquitted
defendant will want to retaliate against the prosecutor, but also because the
prosecutor will have a difficult time proving that his decisions were made in
good faith. 48 The prosecutor's need to rely on evidence presented to him by
140. No. 77-2012, slip op. at 21-25.
141. Id., slip op. at 22-23.
142. Id., slip op. at 17-18. The court noted that because the Committee prosecutes lawyers, it
is even more susceptible to harassment than prosecutors or judges. Id., slip op. at 17; accord,
Mayes v. Honn, 542 F.2d 822, 824 (10th Cir. 1976) (State Board of Examiners); Campbell v.
Washington State Bar Ass'n, 263 F. Supp. 991, 992 (W.D. Wash. 1967) (State Bar Association).
143. No. 77-2012, slip op. at 18-19.
144. Id. at 24 n.55 (Wilkey, 3., dissenting) ("However, these safeguards only protect against
unconstitutional action in the initiation and conduct of lawsuits; they do not protect against
excesses in the investigative or administrative efforts of the Committee.") (emphasis in original).
145. In this sense, the Simons court does not follow the approach set forth in But:. The
Supreme Court specifically examined the safeguards available at the time of the misconduct
charged to the administrative officers. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 515-17 (1978). It
emphasized that the doctrine of immunity derives from the characteristics of the judicial process
including checks on prosecutorial misconduct. See id. at 512. Thus, the Simons conclusion that
safeguards are only secondary to the "maturity" of the investigation is based on a misinterpreta-
tion of Butz.
146. See No. 77-2012, slip op. at 19 n.11, 23 n.15.
147. Although the majority bases its decision on the prima facie case established by the
committee--the lawyers had a local office and were not licensed to practice in local courts-the
dissent argued that, in fact, the violation was not so evident. Id. at 14-22. Furthermore, the
dissent noted that the Committee was conducting inquiries into practices of numerous other
lawyers, and noted that this could have been a "fishing expedition" into criminal activity
comparable to that found in Briggs. Id. at 21-22. It argued that a court should consider the
availability of safeguards in the particular setting, id. at 23-24 n.55, whether a criminal suit had
actually been initiated, id. at 18-20, as well as the particularity. Id. at 20.
148. See note 55 supra and accompanying text.
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others increases this difficulty because he must make judgments even when he
doubts the reliability of the information in his possession. 149 These considera-
tions are not applicable when the prosecutor independently obtains evidence
outside the setting of the courtroom.' 5 0 Finally, because the court does not
consider whether safeguards exist at the time of the alleged offense, its
approach could result in an improper extension of the immunity into areas far
removed from the boundaries suggested in Imbler..
In an attempt to limit the expansion of absolute immunity, the Third
Circuit recently held in Forsyth v. Kleindienst, 151 that when a prosecutor
gathers evidence, he is absolutely immune only if the activity is "necessary" in
deciding whether to commence a criminal action. 5 2 The Third Circuit
addressed this issue in the context of whether two former Attorney Generals
were amenable to a suit alleging illegal wiretaps.' 5 3 Acknowledging that the
implementation of wiretaps is essentially investigative, the court reasoned that
in certain circumstances the prosecutor must be afforded the same latitude to
gather information that he has in deciding to initiate the case. The denial of
absolute immunity could inhibit the prosecutor's investigation and thus lead
to needless actions. 1- 4 The court suggested that a "limited factual inquiry"
might be necessary to determine the nature of the prosecutor's investiga-
tion. -5 The resulting dilution of immunity, the court reasoned, is necessary to
balance the protection due the prosecutor, whose conduct is essential to his
judicial function, and the individual, who alleges a violation of his constitu-
tional rights. 156
The Third Circuit, however, failed to indicate when investigative activities
will be "necessary," other than stating that in certain circumstances investi-
gations will be deemed protected activities.157 Therefore, the proposed hear-
ing could necessitate an examination of the prosecutor's intent and the
objective necessity for the information-standards similar to the good faith
149. See notes 27, 56 supra and accompanying text.
150. See J.D. Pflaumer, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Justice, 450 F. Supp. 1125, 1134
(E.D. Pa. 1978) (arguing that the threat of suit is less likely to affect police-related activities
adversely than it is to affect activities that occur in the courtroom).
151. 599 F.2d 1203 (3d Cir. 1979).
152. Id. at 1215.
153. 599 F.2d at 1205-06.
154. Id. at 1215; accord Wilkinson v. Ellis, No. 77-869, (E.D. Pa. Jan. 21, 1980) (a denial of
absolute immunity for certain investigatory work would dilute the immunity afforded for decision
to initiate).
155. 599 F.2d at 1215. Forsyth was not the first decision to emphasize the necessity of a
hearing. See Slavin v. Curry, 574 F.2d 1256, 1262 (5th Cir. 1978) (reasoning that because the
extent of immunity depends on the position of defendant, hearing usually necessary to determine
that position); cf. Briggs v. Goodwin, 569 F.2d 10, 22 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (immunity must be
determined independently on facts of each case), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 904 (1978). Such a
hearing could effectively destroy the immunity. See Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602,
607 (7th Cir. 1973) ("An essential purpose of the doctrine is to give the officer freedom to exercise
his discretion and to perform his official duties without fear that his conduct will be called into
question at an evidentiary hearing or subject him to personal liability."), cert, denied, 415 U.S.
917 (1974); Delimiting the Scope, supra note 61, at 190-91.




and probable cause requirements of qualified immunity.'S8 Furthermore, the
prosecutor could be forced to participate in numerous hearings because it
could always be alleged that an investigation was unnecessary. Is9 The inquiry
could potentially be employed far more often and in greater depth than the
Forsyth court anticipated.
IlI. A RECOMMENDED APPROACH: Butz v. Econoynou
The traditional approach used to delineate prosecutorial immunity balances
the public's interest in an independent judiciary with the individual's right to
redress for an infringement of constitutional rights. 160 The individual's right
to redress should only be sacrificed to satisfy broader public purposes. 1 6 1 It
benefits the public to hold government officials accountable for their wrongdo-
ing: accordingly, even when a prosecutor functions as an advocate, it is in the
public interest to deny him absolute immunity in certain circumstances. 62 In
these instances, federal damage remedies that compensate an individual and
deter future prosecutorial misconduct would be appropriate.
The approach is best implemented by considering the three factors iden-
tified by the Supreme Court in Butz v. Economou. 163 As a threshold matter,
the challenged activity must be quasi-judicial in nature. ' 6' This requirement,
similar to the jurisdictional limitation on immunity, 165 is intended to remove
from consideration activities that have little or no relation to the enhancement
158. See Delimiting the Scope, supra note 61, at 200 (arguing that such a hearing would
examine the prosecutor's motives rather than his conduct and because intent could not be
determined on the pleadings the purpose of absolute immunity would be undermined)
159. This has been an important consideration in the decision not to grant only qualified
immunity to prosecutors. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 426-27 (1976); Gregoire v- Biddle,
177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950); Cooper v O'Connor, 99 F-2d
135, 140-41 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 643 (1938).
160. See pt. I supra.
161. Because of the unique importance of constitutional rights, United States v- Lee, 106
U.S. 196, 220-21 (1882); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137. 163-66 (1803). it has been
recognized that absolute prosecutorial immunity-which precludes a remedy to victims of the
prosecutor's wrongful conduct-must be extended no further than is absolutely necessary
Forsyth v. Kleindienst, 599 F.2d 1203, 1215 (3d Cir. 1979); Briggs v. Goodwin, 569 F-2d 12, 28
(D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 904 (1978); accord, Butz v. Economou, 438 U S 478,
505-06 (1978) (a grant of absolute immunity to federal executive officials would erode the
protection of constitutional guarantees); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232. 24849 (1974) (same for
executive state officers).
162. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 442 (1976) (White, J., concurring); see Developments,
supra note 2, at 1204 (law enforcement system best served if prosecutors always denied absolute
immunity); Judicial Officers, supra note 2, at 329-36 (same); 47 Miss. L.J. 812, 820 (1976) (same)
On a variety of occasions the Court has opted for protection of individual liberty at the expense of
judicial accuracy. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (evidence seized by state officials
in violation of the Fourth Amendment inadmissible at trial); Weeks v. United States, 232 U S
383 (1914) (exclusionary rule applied to federal agents). See also Brewer v- Williams, 430 U S.
387 (1977) (right to counsel); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination).
163. 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
164. See id. at 511-12.
165. See note 93 supra and accompanying text.
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of judicial decisionmaking. 166 Because it is often difficult to identify how
closely related prosecutorial activity is to the judicial process,167 and because
the performance of almost any activity requires some discretion, 168 this
requirement should be broadly construed.
Arising from the specific context in which the challenged activity is per-
formed, the next two factors actually define when the application of absolute
immunity is justified. First, if the prosecutor is susceptible to suit because of
the nature and setting of his discretionary activities, the grant of absolute
immunity may be essential to ensure that he is not deterred from using his
best judgment. The prosecutor must also be subject to restrictive influences
that check abuse before it deprives an individual of his constitutional
rights. 169 The checks must be adequate to ensure that the risk of unconstitu-
tional behavior does not outweigh the importance of protecting the indepen-
dent judgment of the prosecutor. 170 When there are no safeguards comparable
to those found at trial, federal causes of action are necessary to lessen the risk
that he will misuse the broad range of his authority. 17 1 In most cases, the
presence or absence of checks on abuse will be the crucial factor in determin-
ing the level of immunity to be accorded the prosecutor.
A. Judicial Functions
The Imbler Court established that the prosecutor who initiates and presents
criminal cases meets all three requirements. Therefore, to grant him absolute
immunity benefits the justice system. The decision also indicated that absolute
immunity is not restricted to the prosecutor's courtroom conduct. 172 Although
his decision to commence an action is not made within the confines of a court,
that decision will be reviewed during the proceeding. 173 In addition, at the
indictment stage, the grand jury provides protection to the individual who
could become the victim of a malintentioned prosecutor.
174
166. When the activity is only tangentially related to the judicial process, as in the prepara-
tion or forwarding of the court record and other administrative functions, absolute immunity
should not attach. See note 100 supra.
167. See notes 123-36 supra and accompanying text.
168. See note 108 supra.
169. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 512 (1978); Apton v. Wilson, 506 F.2d 83, 93-94
(D.C. Cir. 1974); Quasi-Judicial Immunity, supra note 14, at 114; cf. Hampton v. Hanrahan, 600
F.2d 600, 632-33 (7th Cir. 1979) (press releases and conferences qualifiedly immune because not
subject to judicial scrutiny), appeal docketed, 48 U.S.L.W. 3414 (U.S. Jan. 1, 1980) (No. 79-912).
170. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 514 (1978).
171. Trial safeguards differ from other deterrent mechanisms, such as private causes of action,
that are remedial. If there are checks present at the point of potential misconduct, it Is less
imperative that other devices be employed to ensure that the Constitution is not violated. See id.
at 512.
172. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 n.33 (1976).
173. Id. at 427; cf. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 515-16 ("administrator's decision to
proceed with a case is subject to scrutiny in the proceeding itself").
174. See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408
U.S. 665, 700 (1972); Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390 (1962). The grand jury "has been
regarded as a primary security to the innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive persecu-
tion." Id.
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Although the grand jury is a means to curb prosecutorial abuse, the
prosecutor may abuse its proper function just as he may use the criminal trial
for his own purposes.' 7" At the same time, a witness who feels he has been
improperly subpoenaed or mistreated may seek retribution against the pros-
ecutor. 176 Despite the nonadversarial nature of the grand jury, the pros-
ecutor is still dependent on evidence that may be contradictory and that may
lead to colorable claims of abuse. Furthermore, the necessity to encourage the
disclosure of evidence to grand juries is as significant as that respecting trial
proceedings. 177 In fact, because the public interest requires that the grand
jury be afforded wide latitude in its investigative and deliberative functions,
only minimal evidentiary restrictions apply during the grand jury proceed-
ing. 17
Although neither judge nor opposing counsel is present during the proceed-
ing, 1'7 9 judicial safeguards are available to lessen the prosecutor's opportunity
to misuse his authority. The grand jury is subject to the direct control of the
trial court in the jurisdiction in which it sits.' 80 In addition, the members of
the grand jury evaluate the credibility of the evidence presented by the
prosecutor and operate as a check on prosecutorial abuse.' 8' Charges of abuse
175. See generally Federal Grand Juries, supra note 132, §§ 9.1-9.7 (1979). A proper function
of the grand jury is to decide whether there is probable cause to indict. United States v.
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974); Branzburg v. Hayes. 408 U.S. 605, 686-87 (1972). Another
function is to issue a written report on the basis of evidence presented by the prosecutor Federal
Grand Juries, supra note 132, § 9.1, at 168-69. Prosecutors have also utilized the proceeding for a
variety of improper purposes. See, e.g., United States v. Woods, 544 F.2d 242, 250 (6th Cir.
1976) (gathering evidence for the criminal trial of an individual not a witness), cet. denied, 430
U.S. 969 (1977); In re September 1971 Grand Jury, 454 F.2d 580, 584-85 (7th Cir. 1971) (securing
intelligence information), rev'd on other grounds sub nonz. United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19
(1973); United States v. Remington, 191 F.2d 246, 251 (2d Cir. 1951) (harassing witnesses), cert.
denied, 343 U.S. 907 (1952).
176. Cf. Daniels v. Kieser, 586 F.2d 64 (7th Cir. 1978) (prosecutor absolutely immune from
charges of malicious prosecution brought by trial witnesses), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 2050 (1979);
Beaver v. Carey, 426 F. Supp. 301 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (public defenders absolutely immune for
charges that witnesses' constitutional rights were violated).
177. See Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 392 (1962) (public interest served by thorough
investigation); United States v. Stone, 429 F.2d 138, 140 (2d Cir. 1970) ("[a) grand jury's
investigation is not fully carried out until every available clue has been run down and all
witnesses examined in every proper way .. .").
178. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343-46 (1974); Costello v. United States, 350
U.S. 359, 364 (1956); Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 282 (1919). See generally Note, The
Grand Jury as an Investigatory Body, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 590 (1961); Note, The Grand Jury-Its
Investigatory Powers and Limitations, 37 Minn. L. Rev. 586 (1953).
179. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974).
180. See, e.g., United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 12 (1973); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408
U.S. 665, 688 (1972). For example, prosecutorial misconduct may lead to pretrial motions to
dismiss indictments. Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b); N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 210.20(l}c) (McKinney
1971).
181. Statewide Grand Juries, supra note 132, at 7 ("[Aplthough the independence of the grand
jury has been questioned .... the prosecutor must interrogate witnesses in front of ... ordinary
citizens, a circumstance which in itself provides some measure of check against abuse of
prosecutorial powers."); see, e.g., United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 579-80 (1976); In re
Grobin, 352 U.S. 330, 347 (1957) (Black, J., dissenting). For a general discussion of grand jury
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may be brought to the court's attention and the abuse may be checked before
it results in constitutional deprivation. Thus, because the proceeding itself
protects individuals from malicious prosecutions, yet simultaneously mini-
mizes prosecutorial abuse, the balance requires that the prosecutor be abso-
lutely protected.
B. Evidence
When the prosecutor functions outside the trial or grand jury setting,
however, the public's interest in protecting personal liberty will usually
predominate. According the prosecutor the freedom to gather evidence may
appear to aid the judicial process: investigations often lead to evidence
relevant to the prosecutor's decision to initiate a case' 8 2 and may ultimately
provide more information for the jury to consider in its deliberations. 183
When these investigations are conducted, however, there are no safeguards
analogous to those found in the courtroom. 18 4 Thus, at the precise point when
an unconstitutional act-a coerced confession or an illegal search-may occur,
the prosecutor is free from judicial supervision. State and federal law en-
forcement officers who regularly engage in such activities have been granted
only a good faith/probable cause defense. ' s s Early decisions justified this
distinction by characterizing the police function as ministerial rather than
discretionary. 186 The more realistic approach focuses on the context, and
therefore potential for abuse, in which the officer performs an activity. 187
Thus, in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 188 the Second Circuit noted
that the fiction that the police officer's duties are not discretionary is main-
tained because the beneficial deterrence provided by a possible suit outweighs
the possible detrimental effect on vigorous performance of their jobs. 289 The
same reasoning should apply to the investigating prosecutor regardless of
whether a particular suspect has been targeted for a criminal action. Admit-
tedly, denial of absolute immunity may cause some disruption of the law
safeguards, see Note, The Presence of Counsel in the Grand Jury Room, 47 Fordham L. Rev.
1138 (1979).
182. E.g., Forsyth v. Kleindienst, 599 F.2d 1203, 1215 (3d Cir. 1979); Atkins v. Lanning, 556
F.2d 485, 488 (loth Cir. 1977).
183. E.g., Daniels v. Kieser, 586 F.2d 64, 69 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 2050
(1979).
184. See Apton v. Wilson, 506 F.2d 83, 93-94 (D.C. Cir. 1974); J.D. Pflaumer, Inc. v. United
States Dep't of Justice, 450 F. Supp. 1125, 1134 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
185. See, e.g., Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967) (police officer); Forsyth v. Klein-
dienst, 599 F.2d 1203, 1211 (3d Cir. 1979) (federal agents); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents, 456 F.2d 1339, 1346 (2d Cir. 1972) (same); Joseph v. Rowlen, 402 F.2d 367, 370 (7th Cir.
1968) (city police officer), aff'd, 425 F.2d 1010 (7th Cir. 1970); Cohen v. Norris, 300 F.2d 24, 33-34
(9th Cir. 1962) (same). 'See. generally Theis, "Good Faith" as a Defense to Suits for Police
Deprivations of Individual Rights, 59 Minn. L. Rev. 991 (1975).
186. Carter v. Carlson, 447 F.2d 358, 362-63 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd on other grounds sub
nom. District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418 (1973).
187. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 456 F.2d 1339, 1346 (2d Cir. 1962);
cf. Ove Gustavsson Contracting Co. v. Floete, 299 F.2d 655, 659 (2d Cir. 1962) (government
officials).
188. 456 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1972).
189. Id. at 1346; accord, Developments, supra note 2, at 835-36.
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enforcement system, but granting him complete protection would enormously
expand the potential for abuse. 190 Because this is compounded by the absence
of judicial surveillance, the balance must be struck in favor of providing a
wronged individual his day in court and achieving the deterrence thereby
effected on future abuse. In these instances, "the judicial process would be
protected-and indeed its integrity enhanced-by denial of immunity to
prosecutors who engage in unconstitutional conduct."' 9'
Finally, other prosecutorial activities may fall within the prosecutor's role
as advocate and yet not be entitled to immunity coverage. For example,
although the suppression of exculpatory evidence is properly not characterized
as investigative, neither is it a quasi-judicial activity that must be pro-
tected.'92 The nondisclosure of information may aid the prosecutor in his role
as advocate. As a quasi-judicial officer of the court, however, the prosecutor's
primary responsibility is to aid the court in its determination of whether an
accused is guilty or innocent-not to obtain a conviction. 9 3 The grant of
absolute immunity to a prosecutor accused of withholding evidence favorable
to the defendant does not encourage conduct beneficial to the judicial pro-
cess. 194 Furthermore, the decision to suppress material evidence is totally
isolated from judicial surveillance. 9 s In the absence of alternative safeguards
the balance of these factors mandates a denial of absolute immunity because
holding the suppressing prosecutor accountable would potentially deter occa-
sions of such misconduct.
CONCLUSION
Absolute prosecutorial immunity serves to protect the independence of the
judicial system. At the same time, it eliminates a significant deterrent of
misconduct-potential civil liability for infringement of individual rights.
Absolute immunity is justified only when safeguards exist to protect against
such abuse. As the duties of the prosecutor expand beyond the courtroom
setting, the requisite judicial restraints disappear. Under these circumstances,
a federal damage remedy is necessary to replace the lacking judicial scrutiny.
Susan 11. Coyne
190. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 442 (1976) (White, J., concurring), Quasi-JudLwial
Immunity, supra note 14, at 109, 115 ("granting an absolute immunity to prosecutors for acts
normally within the sphere of police function might encourage an unhealthy assumption of new
roles by zealous district attorneys").
191. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 442 (1976) (White. J., concurring)
192. Id. at 442-44 (White, J., concurring); Hilliard v. Williams. 465 F.2d 1212. 1218 (6th
Cir.) (deliberate suppression of laboratory report favorable to defendant not covered by absolute
immunity), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1029 (1972); Haaf v. Grams, 355 F. Supp 542, 545 tD Minn,
1973); Peterson v. Stanczak, 48 F.R.D. 426, 431-32 (N.D. Ill. 1969). See also Weathers v.
Ebert, 505 F.2d 514, 516 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 975 (1976).
193. ABA Standards, supra note 44, § 1. 1(a)-(c), at 25. comment § 1.1, at 44 (1971). See also
G. Felkanes, The Criminal Justice System. Its Functions and Personnel 153-54 (1970)
194. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 443 (1976); see notes 74-77 supra and accompanying
text.
195. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 443-44 (1976).
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